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Despite enormous recent challenges, Illinois’ 
economy remains relatively healthy compared to 
other states. As shown in Figure 1, median family 
income in Illinois has remained above the national 
average since at least 1984. After a relatively 
prosperous period in the late 1990s when median 
family income in Illinois exceeded the national 
average by more than $7,000, the most recent data 
indicate that Illinois is now only about $700 above 
the national average. 
While Illinois has been shrinking as a share of the 
nation’s population—from 4.8 percent in 1984 to 4.1 
percent in 2012—Illinois’ recent economic slide may or 
may not be a precursor to long-term economic decline.
In recent recessions, Illinois has a pattern of doing 
worse than the national average and has stumbled to 
slow recoveries. Nonetheless, following the recessions 
that ended in March 1991 and November 2001, 
Illinois eventually regained firm economic footing. 
Unfortunately, the recession that began in December 
2007 and ended in June 2009 has hit both the nation 
and Illinois exceptionally hard, and Illinois’ recovery 
has lagged the nation’s recovery in profound and 
disturbing ways. Figure 2 (on page 2) shows that 
Illinois’ unemployment rate—a major indicator of 













































Figure 1: U.S. and Illinois median household 














Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population 
Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/
statemedian/). Note that because the original source 
contains no data for 2004, it is interpolated based on 
data from 2003 and 2005.
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average following this recession and has remained 
disturbingly high. It is far above the national average 
more than three years after the recession ended. The 
unemployment rate in Illinois is now (November 
2013) about the same as in Michigan (which has 
suffered severe disruption due to the decline of the 
auto industry). Both Illinois and Michigan are much 
higher than our neighboring states of Indiana and 
Wisconsin. 
Of perhaps equal concern is that employment is still 
far below its pre-recession level (as shown in Figure 
3). The labor force, essentially the number of people 
working or looking for work, has shown no growth 
since the start of the recession and has shrunk in recent 
months. These trends do not bode well for economic 
growth in Illinois.
Recent economic woes in Illinois have intensified, 
but did not cause, its fiscal difficulties. Illinois’ fiscal 
woes go back to at least the early 1990s. During the 
period from 2001 to 2006—a period when the Illinois 
economy was doing relatively well—the state ran 
significant budget deficits1 before coming close to 
a balanced budget beginning in 2006. The federal 
stimulus that followed the great recession staved off 
immediate fiscal disaster in Illinois, but deficits began 
to emerge again. By late 2010, Illinois was far behind 
on paying its bills. At that point, budgetary balance 
was no longer possible even with significant increases 
in economic growth, drastic spending cuts, or large tax 
increases.2 In January of 2011, the Illinois legislature 
reacted by approving significant temporary increases 
in the personal and corporate income tax rates and by 
endorsing caps on spending from the state’s general 
funds.
1For more detail about Illinois’ fiscal situation in this period. 
ee Merriman, David. (September 2003). A summary of Illinois’ 
recent fiscal history. Illinois Tax Facts. Taxpayers’ Federation of 
Illinois. 56(6). Available at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/
Illinois_Summary_r11.pdf.
2See Dye, Richard, Hudspeth, Nancy and Merriman, David. 
(2011). Titanic and sinking. The Illinois Report 2011. Institute of 
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Labor force for November 2013 is 
down 116,500 from February.
Employment has recovered somewhat, 
but is still well below 2008 levels.
Figure 3: Illinois Civilian Labor Force and 























































Figure 4: Illinois Consolidated Funds 



















Source: IGPA Fiscal Futures Model. Note: Borrowing 
and fund balance transfers not counted as receipts. FY 
1997 to 2011 are based on historical data; FY 2012 data is 
preliminary; FY 2013 is estimated based on appropriations 
and other information; FY 2014 to 2023 are projected by 
the Fiscal Futures Model. 
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Despite these significant steps by the legislature, 
analysis by The Fiscal Futures Project shows a 
continued significant structural fiscal imbalance. 
Figure 4 (on page 2) uses the Fiscal Futures model to 
show fiscal imbalances, both historical (1997-2012) 
and projected (2013-2023). The model projections are 
based on historical patterns of growth and forecasts 
of key variables that drive individual categories of 
spending and revenue. While this analysis from 
early 2013 incorporates neither the major pension 
changes of November 2013 nor other most recent 
data, the fundamental pattern is unchanged: the 2011 
tax increase and spending caps reduced but did not 
eliminate the budget gap. The phase-out of the tax 
increase scheduled to begin January 1, 2015 will leave 
Illinois with a major structural budget gap that will be 
painful to eliminate.
Figure 5 shows historical data regarding major 
categories of state spending in Illinois over the 
last 17 years. These data were prepared using a 
comprehensive framework that encompasses all 
relevant categories of spending and revenue. It uses 
a consistent methodology so that categories are 
comparable over time.3
Overall, total state spending was close to $70 billion in 
2014 and has grown at a rate of about 4.76 percent per 
year. The most rapidly rising categories of spending 
have been pensions (14.2 percent), other (9.4 percent), 
state employee health care (8.8 percent), debt service 
(8.4 percent) and Medicaid (5.6 percent).  Pensions 
(9.8 percent of spending in 2014) and Medicaid (24.7 
percent of spending in 2014) are both large and growing 
rapidly. Medicaid’s growth has slowed in recent years, 
partly as a result of policy changes, so its share of the 
state budget has been virtually unchanged since 2006. 
Furthermore, the federal government matches half or 
more of Illinois’ Medicaid expenses on a dollar-for-
dollar basis, so any cuts in state Medicaid spending 
will reduce federal revenues simultaneously. 
3For more detail on our methods and sources, see Dye, Richard, 
Nancy Hudspeth and David Merriman 2013 Fiscal Futures 
Project Documentation. Available at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/
system/files/fiscal_futures_documentation_12oct13.pdf. 
Other
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Source for Figures 5 and 6: IGPA’s Fiscal Futures Project; Illinois Comptroller’s data
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As detailed in an Illinois Budget Policy Toolbox paper 
by Richard F. Dye, in December 2013, the state enacted 
major changes in Illinois’ public pension programs, 
but these changes are expected to have only a modest 
impact on pension spending.
Other categories of spending also will not be easy to 
cut. Note that much transportation spending is paid 
for with earmarked taxes and fees. This money is often 
used to provide the state or local share necessary to 
obtain federal matching funds that are available solely 
for transportation-related expenditures. Thus, cuts in 
state transportation spending could reduce federal 
transfers to Illinois, and might have a relatively small 
impact on Illinois’ fiscal gap.
Figure 6 (on page 3) shows historical data on major 
categories of state revenue in Illinois over the last 17 
years. Only four categories of revenue were larger 
than 6 percent in 2014. These were federal sources 
(23.1 percent), individual income taxes (22.3 percent), 
state sales taxes (14.6 percent) and other revenue (9.5 
percent). Of these large revenue categories, those 
growing more rapidly than spending are only the 
individual income tax (growing at 5.8 percent per 
year) and other revenue (growing at 9.5 percent per 
year). Sales tax revenue has been growing only about 
2.7 percent per year, so its share has shrunk from 21 
percent to about 15 percent of revenue.
Given this set of facts, and projected annual fiscal gaps 
on the order of $7 billion, no one should expect that 
balancing Illinois’ budget will be easy. Efforts to close 
the fiscal gap by reducing spending would almost 
certainly have to look at a variety of expenditure 
categories – including those with widespread support 
and those that have already been subjected to very 
significant constraints. Significant increases in revenues 
are unlikely to come from smaller revenue categories, 
and federal revenue sources are largely beyond the 
control of state legislators. Thus, the personal income 
tax and the general sales tax are the only existing 
revenue sources that could feasibly provide substantial 
additional revenue. 
Unfortunately, failure to act to reduce the fiscal gap has 
already had severe negative impacts on Illinois, and 
further inaction is likely to lead to even more serious 
consequences. Perhaps, the most tangible negative 
consequence of Illinois’ fiscal troubles—besides 
painful budgetary cuts and tax increases—has been a 
large backlog of unpaid bills and a greatly tarnished 
credit rating.
Unpaid bills were more than $6.4 billion in December 
of FY2013, an amount that fell by October of FY2014 
to $4.4 billion. Even these staggering sums do not 
completely reflect the magnitude of cash imbalances, 
however, since these figures exclude money owed to 
state-affiliated agencies including the University of 
Illinois. The lack of cash to pay the state’s bills has led 
to substantial delays between the time when a vendor 
bills the state and when the vendor receives payment. 
Even though Illinois compensates vendors for late 
payments in some cases, many vendors probably find 
that it is not worth the trouble; they may avoid bidding 
on state jobs or charge a higher fee when they do bid. 
While the direct cost of this outcome has not been 
quantified, it certainly has resulted in much negative 
publicity that has damaged Illinois’ reputation as a 
business partner.4
More evidence of Illinois’ damaged financial reputation 
comes in the credit ratings given to Illinois debt issues. 
Figure 7 shows the rating of Illinois debt by the three 
major credit rating agencies over the period from 1998 
through 2013. Cells in red indicate a credit downgrade, 
while green cells represent an upgrade, and blue cells 
4Jones, Tim. (December 18, 2013). Vendors unpaid as pitfalls 
impede Illinois’ path to stability. Bloomberg News. Available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-12-18/
vendors-unpaid-as-pitfalls-impede-illinois-s-path-to-stability.
Year S&P Moody's Fitch
1998 AA Aa2 AA
1999 AA Aa2 AA
2000 AA Aa2 AA+
2001 AA Aa2 AA+
2002 AA Aa2 AA+
2003 AA Aa3 AA
2004 AA Aa3 AA
2005 AA Aa3 AA
2006 AA Aa3 AA-
2007 AA Aa3 AA
2008 AA Aa3 AA-
2009 A+ A2 A
2010 A+ A2 A
2011 A+ A1 A






Figure 7: Illinois G.O. Bond Ratings, 1998-2013
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represent no change. All three credit rating agencies 
have downgraded Illinois’ debt several times since 
2003, and Illinois’ bond rating is now among the 
lowest of any state in the country. While it seems very 
unlikely that Illinois will default on any of its debt, the 
lowered credit rating has a tangible cost in the form 
of increased debt service. This cost is probably small 
in comparison to the real, but intangible, reputational 
cost suffered by the state. Illinois’ poor credit rating 
and news of its fiscal problems undercut confidence 
in Illinois’ potential for future economic growth. This 
lack of confidence could translate into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy if businesses, citizens, state employees and 
others decide to locate or invest elsewhere because 
they worry that Illinois’ fiscal troubles could limit their 
future. A credible and widely supported plan that 
charts a course to sustainable fiscal balance could do 
much to reduce the damage from Illinois’ fiscal woes 
and could lead to a brighter economic future. •
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